at issue. Or rather, it is because an extraordinary range ofissues -personal, professional,local,nationalwere at stake that such passages have so much emotional colour. 1 will concentrate here on only one theme: whether and in what sense the law represented prejudice, what critics saw as the persistence of mediaeval thought long past its time, while psychological medicine represented scientific and humanitarian progress. I will simplify in order to highlight particular factors in a very complex situation.
014110878/881 020070·041$02.00/0 © 1988 The Royal Society of Medicine Provoked by defence counsel while summing-up at a trial for murder in 1856, the judge launched an attack on psychiatric witnesses: ' He certainly believed that the jury were as competent to form a correct opinion on matters of this kind as anybody else ... Experts in madnessl Mad doctors! Gentlemen, I will read you the evidence of these medical witnesses -these "experts in madness", -And ifyou can make sane evidence out of what they say, do so; but I confess it's more than I can do ... If the theory of these gentlemen were true of the prisoner, it would be equally true in the case of every criminal, and form a conclusive reason for liberating every person charged with crime." A few years later an Edinburgh medical professor responded to such humiliating attacks: ' Medicine says a man may be insane and irresponsible, and yet know right and wrong; law says a knowledge of right and wrong is the test of both soundness of mind and responsibility to the law. Medicine saya, restrain and cure the insane and imbecile offender against the law; law says, hang, imprison, whip, hunger him. and treats medical art with contempt." Whatever the rhetorical excess displayed in such outbursts, clearly something very substantial was Victorian reform and 'the facts of nature' To 20th century psychiatrists who argued successfully for the 1930 and 1959 Mental Treatment and Mental Health Acts, it was quite clear that progress depended on replacing legal by medical criteria in the administration of mental illness. Many of them would have found it difficult to sympathize with, and impossible to anticipate, the legalistic direction underlying aspects of the 1983 Act (see Unsworth" for an excellent study of legislation from 1890 to the present). But recent legislation suggests that we might look again at the medical reformers' criticisms of the criminal law in the 19th century. In what sense did 'experts in madness' think that progress depended on eliminating statements like the one quoted from Baron Bramwell in 1856?And why were legal men and, it must be acknowledged, many other professional people (including many doctors) opposed to the reformers' view of progress? And, more generally, might we even ask whether there are general criteria for deciding what is progress?
Early and mid-Victorian legislation was often preoccupied with 'reform': above all with extending the franchise, and with major revision of society's response to poverty, penal retribution, conditions of work, urban services, policing, women's property and, of course, insanity. Historians debate whether the movement of ideas known as utilitarianism caused this legislation, but at the very least we can find in utilitarianism the groundwork of a novel and lasting social science approach to social problems. The utilitarianism of the Manchester liberals in political economy or of Edwin Chadwick in public health presupposed that social relations had objective conditions, like nature itself, and that knowledge of these conditions was the only 'rational' basis for social organization. This world view gave 'progress' a very special meaning and significance: 'progress' was the advance of objective knowledge and, with what reformers believed to be an integral development, the acceptance afknowledge as the proper basis for social action. Thus public health and mental health reforms in the 1840s were both preceded by national 'statistical' surveys (really collections of data) of the respective problems, and followed by attempts to deduce complete and self-consistent rational rules as a basis for social administration. This attitude ofmind was not at all restricted to a small, elite group of reformers. The wide popularity ofphrenology (which so influenced alienists like John Conolly) is only one illustration of the prevalent belief that natural laws constituted the basis for social progress". Mechanics' institutes and lending libraries, as well as the Westminster Review or the Lancet, fostered learning and the advance of knowledge as the key to 'improvement'. Further, when the evolutionary theories of Robert Chambers, Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin captured attention from the 1840s on, it was to no small degree because evolution appeared to portray nature itself as embodying a law of progress.
This commitment to progress based upon uncovering and obeying natural law was no flat and unemotional stance. Powerfully influenced by the evangelical revival, Victorian Christian moral fervour gave colour and content to the growing natural knowledge and to the social changes which it indicated. We should not think that there was any necessary divide between a religious and a secular conception of progress. Indeed, it may have been precisely that Christian evocation of purpose in natural law that made the objective study of nature so inspirational for reformers. In summary, across the whole range of what we would call the biomedical and the social sciences, we find Victorians emotively appealing to natural law as a prescription for social action.
Medical criticism of the M'Naghten Rules
This dimension of Victorian moral culture is essential for understanding the vehemence with which a small group of alienists attacked dominant notions of criminal responsibility. Their attack also fed upon very real practical and intellectual confusions. The reformist culture makes it understandable that the M'Naghten Rules have acquired a symbolic as well as a technical position at the heart of the last 150 years' contentions about criminal insanity. Neither the Rules nor the famous trial in 1843 which led to their formulation need discussion here5.6; I will point only to two well-known and related features.
First, though part of the events that produced disquiet was the presentation of expert medical evidence, the institutional procedure that was used to clarify the state of the law was entirely legal. There Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 81 February 1988 71 were no institutional channels, and it did not occur to anyone in the House of Lords (where the relevant decisions took place) to provide for a medical input into the review process. Second, the Lord Justices used an exclusively legalistic way of thought to define the criteria that exculpated a mentally disordered person from responsibility. In describing exculpatory criteria in terms of a lack of knowledge, they reiterated traditional jurisprudential theory that knowledge was central to criminal intent. They also emphasized legal evidential requirements, reinforcing assumptions that the courts were practised in judging whether or not an accused person had possessed knowledge. The whole direction of the Rules was to subsume the question of criminal insanity under the traditions of law. (Whether and to what extent this formulation dominated practice is another matter.)
These points were not lost on alienists in the mid-1840s. Lord Ashley's report on the conditions oflunatics in England and Wales appeared in 1844, followed by legislation for a national asylum system; the Association of Medical Officers of Asylums and Hospitals for the Insane had just been founded in 1841; and the symbol of Conolly and humanitarian non-restraint was still freshly gilded. Equally significantly, the 1830s had seen sentencing policy change greatly, with the repeal of the 'Bloody Code' and the restriction of capital punishment for most felonies. Pentonville, by design a model reformatory, first closed its doors in 1842. Lunacy and penal changes alike strongly embodied the beliefs of reform: knowledge of human nature would provide techniques to remodel the delinquent and the distraught into moral citizens. The new legislation and administration, it appeared, replaced traditional and irrational reactions to crime and madness by scientific and rational procedure, or, in short, by progress. The M'Naghten Rules therefore stood out in sharp contrast.
Critical alienists also had a much more specific objection.They experienced the Rules as an imputation against their expertise and professional status. This experience sharpened the emotional tone, adding as it did a personal concern to a wider concern about the progress of humanity. As the published work, for example, ofEsquirol in France, Prichard in England, Ray in the United States, or Griesinger in Germany agreed, clinical medicine now knew that insanity was primarily a disorder of the emotional and volitional rather than intellectual powers, correlated with breakdown in the brain. Alienists believed that such knowledge ought to be of great relevance to judging responsibility for crime. It was in this context that debates about 'moral insanity' and 'irresistible impulse' had significance. Examples of morally insane or irresistible conduct represented the extreme (but thereby illuminating) cases in which a specialist's contact with the insane produced a form of knowledge which the public -or lawyers -did not have. Doctors argued about the value, clarity and content of the moral insanity category from the 1830s to the end of the century. Nevertheless, insanity specialists all agreed with the general proposition that to limit diagnosis to disorder in knowledge or reasoning was hopelessly inadequate.
It therefore appeared that the law was woefully, and perhaps even wilfully, ignorant when their Lordships formulated the Rules and when trial judges subsequently cited them in addressing juries. There were not many legal or medical minds well equipped to deal with this. Few medical practitioners had much experience of appearing as expert witnesses, either for forensic clinical and pathological matters or for psychiatric questions, though this was changing. They were thus unfamiliar with the reasoning behind the adversarial procedure, evidential rules, and jurisprudence of the criminal courts. Insanity specialists understood the Rules in the light of their own new-found identity as experts, as objective observers of disease, and as reformers building social policy on known facts. On this reading, the Rules did not just ignore facts, they negated the imperative to act on the basis of facts. The law did not take into account medical knowledge as a basis for socially important judgment; and then it compounded the error by formulating exculpatory criteria which ignored what modern medicine specifically did know about disease of the mind.
A leading representative of general medicine, J Russell Reynolds, put the issue succinctly-when he accused the law of creating 'artificial lines, untrue to Nature". Like Victorian writers generally, he gave Nature a capital 'N'. Nature had acquired the status that earlier ages had attributed to God: the initial capital letter, but also the value that it constituted the ultimate ground of authority for knowing what it was right to do.
'Artificiality' in social arrangements was exactly what reform sought to remove, whether artificiality took the form of an unrepresentative Parliament, Com Laws that favoured one segment of the economy against another, or sent a lunatic to the gallows to satisfy mediaeval notions of retribution. When the biologist Thomas Henry Huxley later attacked the Catholic Church for bigotry over Darwin, it was in the same terms. For Huxley, the Church, in Pope Pius IX's Syllabus ofthe principal errors ofour time (1864),had, like the law in the M'Naghten Rules, set itself against both the pursuit and the results of scientific learning. And just as Huxley thought the 'mediaeval' Church reared people who in their ignorance could not becomemoral citizens, so alienists thought the 'mediaeval' law hanged those who in their disease could not act responsibly.
Legal authority and argument
Since the legal institutions had deeply entrenched powers, as indeed they still do on occasions of confrontation with claims from scientific experts, the accusations from insanity specialists were not a serious matter. The shrillness of tone of some medical polemics indeed reflects frustration at being ignored. But the legal position was not simply a product of longstanding power; it also defended some profound and far-reaching arguments. These arguments, at their best, exposed weaknesses at the heart of what to many Victorian doctors and scientists were the 'selfevident' values of reform and progress. I want to emphasize just two components oflegalistic reasoning, but these are both components which suggest reasons why medical reformers have so often had difficulty in dominating public consciousness in the psychiatric area.
If, as Reynolds? said, the M'Naghten Rules were 'artificial', a reflective writer on jurisprudence might have observed that this was justly so: that law, like society, was indeed 'artificial' in the sense that it was the creation of purposeful human beings. Thus law could be grounded on natural facts only where society itself was in a state of nature, and this was not so for a Christian culture. It followed, on this view, that legal rules should be assessed by whether they assisted social purposes, not by whether they were deducible from scientific knowledge. In historical actuality, this general argument appeared in a narrower legalistic guise. Lawyers argued that the Rules -and decisions about criminal responsibility generally -did not consider criteria for deciding insanity but criteria for deciding criminal intent (or mens rea). Thus the law was not concerned with drawing distinctions in nature (distinguishing disease), but with drawing distinctions between social events (distinguishing crime).
In the Victorian reforming context, however, a philosophy ofjurisprudence which defended 'artificial' rules appeared to be defending conservatism, prejudice and outdated modes of thought. The whole thrust of Victorian utilitarian and evolutionary social and political thought was to collapse distinctions between nature and society, turning the jurisprudence I have described into an anachronism. Physicians, as an occupational group, have often been sympathetic to what we may call this naturalization of social thought, and this is especially true of Victorian insanity specialists. Yet it must be recognized that it has been a highly contentious matter for the social sciences since the 19th century to decide whether or not the natural sciences do provide an adequate framework of understanding in the human sciences. Further, unlike the Victorian reformers, we may be sceptical about turning to 'Nature' as a foundation for progressive social policy (see Chorover'' for a general critique of 'psychotechnologies').
The secondpertinent legal argument follows on from the first. If the decision in law about responsibility is not a decision about 'facts of nature', then experts about such factsi.e, psychiatrists -may not be the best (let alone the only) witnesses to aid a legal decision. Victorian judges could be quite aggressive about this, telling juries that, 'you are not to be deprived ofthe exercise ofyour commonsense because a gentleman comes from London and tells you scientific sense". To claim that common sense rather than scientific sense should regulate policy toward the insane appeared to call the whole new profession of psychological medicine into question. Overall, therefore, alienists found themselves in an ambiguous position in relation to social policy. Society was increasingly willing for them to administer civil insanity; at the same time, the law could humiliate them over judgments about criminal insanity. The situation was even more difficult, since psychiatric claims to specialist scientific knowledge were often poorly founded, and lawyers therefore had little difficulty in making this knowledge appear inferior to common-senseknowledge in the adversarial setting of the court. Judges and counsel in actual cases combined restricting the scope of expert evidence in general and revealing the inadequacies of particular expert evidence.
Conclusion: the general and the particular This is a description of the Victorian controversy about the insanity defence in very general terms. But what made the insanity defence sometimes so particularly sharp an issue was its public face: a spectacular crime and a trial with life or death as the outcome. Trials have the form of theatre; profound issues of human concern become concrete in the individuality of participants and in the shape of the plot as the trial unfolds. Whatever the underlying issues, it is very important to remember that the outcome of a particular trial was always deeply influenced by special-sometimes unique -factors, and that this explains the variety and apparent inconsistency of verdicts where there was a defence plea of insanity. Nevertheless, if we are to understand the controversy, whether about a particular case or in general, we must understand general issues behind the particular trial and behind the representation of the particular plot.
Very briefly, consider Michael Stokes, a soldier in garrison at York, who one day walked across a barrack room to shoot a visiting wife dead in front of her husband. He was well known to beeccentric and, using the term in its colloquial rather than medical sense, the shooting was certainly a 'mad' thing to do. His defence counsel tried to bring the colloquial and the medical senses together, by arguing that to do such a thing without apparent motive, without concealment, and with the certainty of instant arrest, was possible only as a result of insanity. He argued, in effect, that the atrocity was itselfproofof madness; it was conduct for which disease and not reason must be accounted the cause. But, as thejudge very sceptically observed, 'who enabled them to dive into the human heart, and see the real motive that prompted the commission of such deeds?'lO. Perhaps the judge imagined that Stokes knew well what he was doing and why -however eccentric, and hence difficult to imagine, his reasoning. Alienists, of course, told a different story, about how obsessive ideas might lead to uncontrollable actions. In this way very general issues took the form of individual drama, and in the drama society rehearsed its options for thinking about the wider issues.
In thus sketching-in aspects of this Victorian controversy, I have suggested that it is so complex and so durable because three levels of events and interpretation are always present. First, there were the shaping conceptions of relations between nature and society. At this level, there is debate which has a political character, concerning as it does the grounds on which collective life is fostered. At the second level, particular institutions, with their own traditions and Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 81 February 1988 73 interests, mediate the general conceptual and political frameworks in the workings ofsociety. Here we can see how, for example, the establishment of the specialist medicopsychological occupation or the persistence of lay juries are relevant dimensions of events. Finally, at the specific level ofthe trial, there is an experience of the horror and pathos ofindividual human tragedy. The challenge is to clarify the relations between these three levels so that we can understand why the insanity defence has been embroiled in controversy.
Introduction
This paper examines how the criminally insane were treated in practice in the context of county prisons and county asylums, and asks how practice reflected theory about criminal lunacy. From the mid-Victorian era, the debate concerning mentally disordered offenders was focused less on criminal responsibility and more on whether they should be dealt with penally or psychiatrically. The Criminal Lunacy Act of 1800 had provided for a finding of unfitness to plead at trial, and the M'Naghten Rules of 1843 provided for a finding of insanity at trial. However. the 'Rules' or right-wrong test of insanity left out a whole range of persons who as non-offenders were certifiable 8S insane, but did not qualify for a finding of insanity in the criminal courts 1 .2. Moreover, these juridical provisions did not extend to petty offenders, large numbers of whom were sentenced by magistrates to short terms of imprisonment. In many cases the magistrates had no option but to commit mentally disordered or deficient offenders to prison. Ifinsanity was later certified in prison, these people would be sent to a local county asylum, not to one of the state criminal lunatic asylums. In the latter half of the century the public asylums housed over half of all the
